LSAT 67 RC3 2x
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Review these RC quizzes right after you do them. For anything that you’re not 100% on google the first bunch of words of the question and seek out explanations online. If after spending some time reviewing you’re still having a tough time then bring the question to your next tutoring session. Really fight to understand the logic of these questions. Remember: 1 is correct 4 are incorrect. Really push yourself to be black and white with correct v. incorrect. It is extremely rare that two answer choices are technically OK but one is stronger. It can happen but we’re talking 1% of the time. So, with that in mind let’s have the mindset that it never happens and that we need to be binary: 1 correct. 4 incorrect. That mindset is key to improvement.
Answer key:
LSAT 67 RC3 Q1 – A
LSAT 67 RC3 Q2 – E
LSAT 67 RC3 Q3 – B
LSAT 67 RC3 Q4 – B
LSAT 67 RC3 Q5 – A
LSAT 67 RC3 Q6 – D
LSAT 67 RC3 Q7 – C
LSAT 67 RC3 Q8 – E
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- Question 1 of 8
1. Question
Can a sovereign have unlimited legal power? If a sovereign does have unlimited legal power, then the sovereign presumably has the legal power to limit or even completely abdicate its own legal power. But doing so would mean that the sovereign no longer has unlimited legal power, thereby contradicting the Initial supposition. This theoretical conundrum is traditionally known as the paradox of omnipotence.
Social scientists have recognized that sovereign omnipotence can be a source of considerable practical difficulty for sovereigns themselves. Douglass North and Barry Weingast show that English and French monarchies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries confronted a practical challenge created by the paradox of their own omnipotence.
North and Weingast point out that it is often in a sovereign’s best interest to make a credible commitment not to perform certain acts. For example, a sovereign with absolute power can refuse to honor its financial commitments. Yet creditors will not voluntarily lend generous amounts at favourable terms to an absolute monarch who can renege upon debts at will.
In the struggle to expand their empires, the English and French monarchies required vast amounts of capital. At the outset of the seventeenth century, however, neither regime could credibly commit itself to repay debts or to honor property rights. The absence of limitations upon the legal power of monarchs meant that there was no law or commitment monarchs could make that they could not also unmake or disregard. Consequently, these monarchs earned a reputation for expropriating wealth, repudiating debts, and reneging upon commitments. Not surprisingly, creditors took such behavior into account and demanded higher interest rates from monarchs than from the monarchs’ wealthy subjects.
North and Weingast argue that the constitutional settlement imposed in England by the Glorious Revolution of 1688 halted such faithless conduct. Henceforth, Parliament controlled the Crown’s purse strings. Parliament, in tum, represented commercial interests that would not tolerate governmental disregard for property rights. The Crown’s newfound inability to dishonor its commitments translated into a newfound ability to borrow: the Crown’s borrowing increased and interest rates fell, because lenders concluded that the Crown would honor its debts.
Thanks to North, Weingast, and others writing in the same vein, it is now conventional to hold that constitutional arrangements benefit sovereigns by limiting their power. But such scholars neglect the extent to which constitutions can fail in this regard. For example, the constitutional settlement imposed by the Glorious Revolution did not solve the paradox of omnipotence but just relocated the problem from one branch of government to another: whereas it was once the Crown that lacked the power to bind itself, it is now Parliament that lacks this power. The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is a pillar of England’s unwritten constitution, and it provides that Parliament lacks legal power over the extent of its own legal power.
1. Which one of the following most accurately expresses the main point of the passage?
CorrectIncorrect - Question 2 of 8
2. Question
Can a sovereign have unlimited legal power? If a sovereign does have unlimited legal power, then the sovereign presumably has the legal power to limit or even completely abdicate its own legal power. But doing so would mean that the sovereign no longer has unlimited legal power, thereby contradicting the Initial supposition. This theoretical conundrum is traditionally known as the paradox of omnipotence.
Social scientists have recognized that sovereign omnipotence can be a source of considerable practical difficulty for sovereigns themselves. Douglass North and Barry Weingast show that English and French monarchies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries confronted a practical challenge created by the paradox of their own omnipotence.
North and Weingast point out that it is often in a sovereign’s best interest to make a credible commitment not to perform certain acts. For example, a sovereign with absolute power can refuse to honor its financial commitments. Yet creditors will not voluntarily lend generous amounts at favourable terms to an absolute monarch who can renege upon debts at will.
In the struggle to expand their empires, the English and French monarchies required vast amounts of capital. At the outset of the seventeenth century, however, neither regime could credibly commit itself to repay debts or to honor property rights. The absence of limitations upon the legal power of monarchs meant that there was no law or commitment monarchs could make that they could not also unmake or disregard. Consequently, these monarchs earned a reputation for expropriating wealth, repudiating debts, and reneging upon commitments. Not surprisingly, creditors took such behavior into account and demanded higher interest rates from monarchs than from the monarchs’ wealthy subjects.
North and Weingast argue that the constitutional settlement imposed in England by the Glorious Revolution of 1688 halted such faithless conduct. Henceforth, Parliament controlled the Crown’s purse strings. Parliament, in tum, represented commercial interests that would not tolerate governmental disregard for property rights. The Crown’s newfound inability to dishonor its commitments translated into a newfound ability to borrow: the Crown’s borrowing increased and interest rates fell, because lenders concluded that the Crown would honor its debts.
Thanks to North, Weingast, and others writing in the same vein, it is now conventional to hold that constitutional arrangements benefit sovereigns by limiting their power. But such scholars neglect the extent to which constitutions can fail in this regard. For example, the constitutional settlement imposed by the Glorious Revolution did not solve the paradox of omnipotence but just relocated the problem from one branch of government to another: whereas it was once the Crown that lacked the power to bind itself, it is now Parliament that lacks this power. The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is a pillar of England’s unwritten constitution, and it provides that Parliament lacks legal power over the extent of its own legal power.
2. The passage most strongly supports the claim that creditors in England and France in the years before 1688 held which one of the following views about wealthy subjects in those countries?
CorrectIncorrect - Question 3 of 8
3. Question
Can a sovereign have unlimited legal power? If a sovereign does have unlimited legal power, then the sovereign presumably has the legal power to limit or even completely abdicate its own legal power. But doing so would mean that the sovereign no longer has unlimited legal power, thereby contradicting the Initial supposition. This theoretical conundrum is traditionally known as the paradox of omnipotence.
Social scientists have recognized that sovereign omnipotence can be a source of considerable practical difficulty for sovereigns themselves. Douglass North and Barry Weingast show that English and French monarchies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries confronted a practical challenge created by the paradox of their own omnipotence.
North and Weingast point out that it is often in a sovereign’s best interest to make a credible commitment not to perform certain acts. For example, a sovereign with absolute power can refuse to honor its financial commitments. Yet creditors will not voluntarily lend generous amounts at favourable terms to an absolute monarch who can renege upon debts at will.
In the struggle to expand their empires, the English and French monarchies required vast amounts of capital. At the outset of the seventeenth century, however, neither regime could credibly commit itself to repay debts or to honor property rights. The absence of limitations upon the legal power of monarchs meant that there was no law or commitment monarchs could make that they could not also unmake or disregard. Consequently, these monarchs earned a reputation for expropriating wealth, repudiating debts, and reneging upon commitments. Not surprisingly, creditors took such behavior into account and demanded higher interest rates from monarchs than from the monarchs’ wealthy subjects.
North and Weingast argue that the constitutional settlement imposed in England by the Glorious Revolution of 1688 halted such faithless conduct. Henceforth, Parliament controlled the Crown’s purse strings. Parliament, in tum, represented commercial interests that would not tolerate governmental disregard for property rights. The Crown’s newfound inability to dishonor its commitments translated into a newfound ability to borrow: the Crown’s borrowing increased and interest rates fell, because lenders concluded that the Crown would honor its debts.
Thanks to North, Weingast, and others writing in the same vein, it is now conventional to hold that constitutional arrangements benefit sovereigns by limiting their power. But such scholars neglect the extent to which constitutions can fail in this regard. For example, the constitutional settlement imposed by the Glorious Revolution did not solve the paradox of omnipotence but just relocated the problem from one branch of government to another: whereas it was once the Crown that lacked the power to bind itself, it is now Parliament that lacks this power. The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is a pillar of England’s unwritten constitution, and it provides that Parliament lacks legal power over the extent of its own legal power.
3. Based on the passage, which one of the following considerations would be most important for an English creditor after the Glorious Revolution who is deciding whether to lend money to the Crown at a relatively low interest rate?
CorrectIncorrect - Question 4 of 8
4. Question
Can a sovereign have unlimited legal power? If a sovereign does have unlimited legal power, then the sovereign presumably has the legal power to limit or even completely abdicate its own legal power. But doing so would mean that the sovereign no longer has unlimited legal power, thereby contradicting the Initial supposition. This theoretical conundrum is traditionally known as the paradox of omnipotence.
Social scientists have recognized that sovereign omnipotence can be a source of considerable practical difficulty for sovereigns themselves. Douglass North and Barry Weingast show that English and French monarchies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries confronted a practical challenge created by the paradox of their own omnipotence.
North and Weingast point out that it is often in a sovereign’s best interest to make a credible commitment not to perform certain acts. For example, a sovereign with absolute power can refuse to honor its financial commitments. Yet creditors will not voluntarily lend generous amounts at favourable terms to an absolute monarch who can renege upon debts at will.
In the struggle to expand their empires, the English and French monarchies required vast amounts of capital. At the outset of the seventeenth century, however, neither regime could credibly commit itself to repay debts or to honor property rights. The absence of limitations upon the legal power of monarchs meant that there was no law or commitment monarchs could make that they could not also unmake or disregard. Consequently, these monarchs earned a reputation for expropriating wealth, repudiating debts, and reneging upon commitments. Not surprisingly, creditors took such behavior into account and demanded higher interest rates from monarchs than from the monarchs’ wealthy subjects.
North and Weingast argue that the constitutional settlement imposed in England by the Glorious Revolution of 1688 halted such faithless conduct. Henceforth, Parliament controlled the Crown’s purse strings. Parliament, in tum, represented commercial interests that would not tolerate governmental disregard for property rights. The Crown’s newfound inability to dishonor its commitments translated into a newfound ability to borrow: the Crown’s borrowing increased and interest rates fell, because lenders concluded that the Crown would honor its debts.
Thanks to North, Weingast, and others writing in the same vein, it is now conventional to hold that constitutional arrangements benefit sovereigns by limiting their power. But such scholars neglect the extent to which constitutions can fail in this regard. For example, the constitutional settlement imposed by the Glorious Revolution did not solve the paradox of omnipotence but just relocated the problem from one branch of government to another: whereas it was once the Crown that lacked the power to bind itself, it is now Parliament that lacks this power. The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is a pillar of England’s unwritten constitution, and it provides that Parliament lacks legal power over the extent of its own legal power.
4. Which one of the following principles underlies the author’s argument in the last paragraph of the passage?
CorrectIncorrect - Question 5 of 8
5. Question
Can a sovereign have unlimited legal power? If a sovereign does have unlimited legal power, then the sovereign presumably has the legal power to limit or even completely abdicate its own legal power. But doing so would mean that the sovereign no longer has unlimited legal power, thereby contradicting the Initial supposition. This theoretical conundrum is traditionally known as the paradox of omnipotence.
Social scientists have recognized that sovereign omnipotence can be a source of considerable practical difficulty for sovereigns themselves. Douglass North and Barry Weingast show that English and French monarchies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries confronted a practical challenge created by the paradox of their own omnipotence.
North and Weingast point out that it is often in a sovereign’s best interest to make a credible commitment not to perform certain acts. For example, a sovereign with absolute power can refuse to honor its financial commitments. Yet creditors will not voluntarily lend generous amounts at favourable terms to an absolute monarch who can renege upon debts at will.
In the struggle to expand their empires, the English and French monarchies required vast amounts of capital. At the outset of the seventeenth century, however, neither regime could credibly commit itself to repay debts or to honor property rights. The absence of limitations upon the legal power of monarchs meant that there was no law or commitment monarchs could make that they could not also unmake or disregard. Consequently, these monarchs earned a reputation for expropriating wealth, repudiating debts, and reneging upon commitments. Not surprisingly, creditors took such behavior into account and demanded higher interest rates from monarchs than from the monarchs’ wealthy subjects.
North and Weingast argue that the constitutional settlement imposed in England by the Glorious Revolution of 1688 halted such faithless conduct. Henceforth, Parliament controlled the Crown’s purse strings. Parliament, in tum, represented commercial interests that would not tolerate governmental disregard for property rights. The Crown’s newfound inability to dishonor its commitments translated into a newfound ability to borrow: the Crown’s borrowing increased and interest rates fell, because lenders concluded that the Crown would honor its debts.
Thanks to North, Weingast, and others writing in the same vein, it is now conventional to hold that constitutional arrangements benefit sovereigns by limiting their power. But such scholars neglect the extent to which constitutions can fail in this regard. For example, the constitutional settlement imposed by the Glorious Revolution did not solve the paradox of omnipotence but just relocated the problem from one branch of government to another: whereas it was once the Crown that lacked the power to bind itself, it is now Parliament that lacks this power. The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is a pillar of England’s unwritten constitution, and it provides that Parliament lacks legal power over the extent of its own legal power.
5. According to the passage, which one of the following was a consequence of the absence of limitations on the legal power of English and French monarchs in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries?
CorrectIncorrect - Question 6 of 8
6. Question
Can a sovereign have unlimited legal power? If a sovereign does have unlimited legal power, then the sovereign presumably has the legal power to limit or even completely abdicate its own legal power. But doing so would mean that the sovereign no longer has unlimited legal power, thereby contradicting the Initial supposition. This theoretical conundrum is traditionally known as the paradox of omnipotence.
Social scientists have recognized that sovereign omnipotence can be a source of considerable practical difficulty for sovereigns themselves. Douglass North and Barry Weingast show that English and French monarchies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries confronted a practical challenge created by the paradox of their own omnipotence.
North and Weingast point out that it is often in a sovereign’s best interest to make a credible commitment not to perform certain acts. For example, a sovereign with absolute power can refuse to honor its financial commitments. Yet creditors will not voluntarily lend generous amounts at favourable terms to an absolute monarch who can renege upon debts at will.
(24) In the struggle to expand their empires, the English and French monarchies required vast amounts of capital. At the outset of the seventeenth century (26), however, neither regime could credibly commit itself to repay debts or to honor property rights. The absence of limitations upon the legal power of monarchs meant that there was no law or commitment monarchs could make that they could not also unmake or disregard. Consequently, these monarchs earned a reputation for expropriating wealth, repudiating debts, and reneging upon commitments. Not surprisingly, creditors took such behavior into account and demanded higher interest rates from monarchs than from the monarchs’ wealthy subjects.
North and Weingast argue that the constitutional settlement imposed in England by the Glorious Revolution of 1688 halted such faithless conduct. Henceforth, Parliament controlled the Crown’s purse strings. Parliament, in tum, represented commercial interests that would not tolerate governmental disregard for property rights. The Crown’s newfound inability to dishonor its commitments translated into a newfound ability to borrow: the Crown’s borrowing increased and interest rates fell, because lenders concluded that the Crown would honor its debts.
Thanks to North, Weingast, and others writing in the same vein, it is now conventional to hold that constitutional arrangements benefit sovereigns by limiting their power. But such scholars neglect the extent to which constitutions can fail in this regard. For example, the constitutional settlement imposed by the Glorious Revolution did not solve the paradox of omnipotence but just relocated the problem from one branch of government to another: whereas it was once the Crown that lacked the power to bind itself, it is now Parliament that lacks this power. The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is a pillar of England’s unwritten constitution, and it provides that Parliament lacks legal power over the extent of its own legal power.
6. The author mentions the English and French monarchies’ need for capital (lines 24-26) primarily in order to
CorrectIncorrect - Question 7 of 8
7. Question
Can a sovereign have unlimited legal power? If a sovereign does have unlimited legal power, then the sovereign presumably has the legal power to limit or even completely abdicate its own legal power. But doing so would mean that the sovereign no longer has unlimited legal power, thereby contradicting the Initial supposition. This theoretical conundrum is traditionally known as the paradox of omnipotence.
Social scientists have recognized that sovereign omnipotence can be a source of considerable practical difficulty for sovereigns themselves. Douglass North and Barry Weingast show that English and French monarchies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries confronted a practical challenge created by the paradox of their own omnipotence.
North and Weingast point out that it is often in a sovereign’s best interest to make a credible commitment not to perform certain acts. For example, a sovereign with absolute power can refuse to honor its financial commitments. Yet creditors will not voluntarily lend generous amounts at favourable terms to an absolute monarch who can renege upon debts at will.
In the struggle to expand their empires, the English and French monarchies required vast amounts of capital. At the outset of the seventeenth century, however, neither regime could credibly commit itself to repay debts or to honor property rights. The absence of limitations upon the legal power of monarchs meant that there was no law or commitment monarchs could make that they could not also unmake or disregard. Consequently, these monarchs earned a reputation for expropriating wealth, repudiating debts, and reneging upon commitments. Not surprisingly, creditors took such behavior into account and demanded higher interest rates from monarchs than from the monarchs’ wealthy subjects.
North and Weingast argue that the constitutional settlement imposed in England by the Glorious Revolution of 1688 halted such faithless conduct. Henceforth, Parliament controlled the Crown’s purse strings. Parliament, in tum, represented commercial interests that would not tolerate governmental disregard for property rights. The Crown’s newfound inability to dishonor its commitments translated into a newfound ability to borrow: the Crown’s borrowing increased and interest rates fell, because lenders concluded that the Crown would honor its debts.
Thanks to North, Weingast, and others writing in the same vein, it is now conventional to hold that constitutional arrangements benefit sovereigns by limiting their power. But such scholars neglect the extent to which constitutions can fail in this regard. For example, the constitutional settlement imposed by the Glorious Revolution did not solve the paradox of omnipotence but just relocated the problem from one branch of government to another: whereas it was once the Crown that lacked the power to bind itself, it is now Parliament that lacks this power. The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is a pillar of England’s unwritten constitution, and it provides that Parliament lacks legal power over the extent of its own legal power.
7. Suppose the Parliament in England makes a commitment to become a permanent member of a multinational body. It can be inferred from the passage that
CorrectIncorrect - Question 8 of 8
8. Question
Can a sovereign have unlimited legal power? If a sovereign does have unlimited legal power, then the sovereign presumably has the legal power to limit or even completely abdicate its own legal power. But doing so would mean that the sovereign no longer has unlimited legal power, thereby contradicting the Initial supposition. This theoretical conundrum is traditionally known as the paradox of omnipotence.
Social scientists have recognized that sovereign omnipotence can be a source of considerable practical difficulty for sovereigns themselves. Douglass North and Barry Weingast show that English and French monarchies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries confronted a practical challenge created by the paradox of their own omnipotence.
North and Weingast point out that it is often in a sovereign’s best interest to make a credible commitment not to perform certain acts. For example, a sovereign with absolute power can refuse to honor its financial commitments. Yet creditors will not voluntarily lend generous amounts at favourable terms to an absolute monarch who can renege upon debts at will.
In the struggle to expand their empires, the English and French monarchies required vast amounts of capital. At the outset of the seventeenth century, however, neither regime could credibly commit itself to repay debts or to honor property rights. The absence of limitations upon the legal power of monarchs meant that there was no law or commitment monarchs could make that they could not also unmake or disregard. Consequently, these monarchs earned a reputation for expropriating wealth, repudiating debts, and reneging upon commitments. Not surprisingly, creditors took such behavior into account and demanded higher interest rates from monarchs than from the monarchs’ wealthy subjects.
North and Weingast argue that the constitutional settlement imposed in England by the Glorious Revolution of 1688 halted such faithless conduct. Henceforth, Parliament controlled the Crown’s purse strings. Parliament, in tum, represented commercial interests that would not tolerate governmental disregard for property rights. The Crown’s newfound inability to dishonor its commitments translated into a newfound ability to borrow: the Crown’s borrowing increased and interest rates fell, because lenders concluded that the Crown would honor its debts.
Thanks to North, Weingast, and others writing in the same vein, it is now conventional to hold that constitutional arrangements benefit sovereigns by limiting their power. But such scholars neglect the extent to which constitutions can fail in this regard. For example, the constitutional settlement imposed by the Glorious Revolution did not solve the paradox of omnipotence but just relocated the problem from one branch of government to another: whereas it was once the Crown that lacked the power to bind itself, it is now Parliament that lacks this power. The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty is a pillar of England’s unwritten constitution, and it provides that Parliament lacks legal power over the extent of its own legal power.
8. Which one of the following claims would be accepted by North and Weingast but not by the author of the passage?
CorrectIncorrect