LSAT 59 RC3 2x
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Review these RC quizzes right after you do them. For anything that you’re not 100% on google the first bunch of words of the question and seek out explanations online. If after spending some time reviewing you’re still having a tough time then bring the question to your next tutoring session. Really fight to understand the logic of these questions. Remember: 1 is correct 4 are incorrect. Really push yourself to be black and white with correct v. incorrect. It is extremely rare that two answer choices are technically OK but one is stronger. It can happen but we’re talking 1% of the time. So, with that in mind let’s have the mindset that it never happens and that we need to be binary: 1 correct. 4 incorrect. That mindset is key to improvement.
Answer key:
LSAT 59 RC3 Q1 – B
LSAT 59 RC3 Q2 – D
LSAT 59 RC3 Q3 – D
LSAT 59 RC3 Q4 – C
LSAT 59 RC3 Q5 – D
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Question 1 of 5
1. Question
In an experiment, two strangers are given the opportunity to share $100, subject to the following constraints: One person—the “proposer”—is to suggest how to divide the money and can make only one such proposal. The other person—the “responder”— must either accept or reject the offer without qualification. Both parties know that if the offer is accepted, the money will be split as agreed, but if the offer is rejected, neither will receive anything.
This scenario is called the Ultimatum Game. Researchers have conducted it numerous times with a wide variety of volunteers. Many participants in the role of the proposer seem instinctively to feel that they should offer 50 percent to the responder, because such a division is “fair” and therefore likely to be accepted. Two-thirds of proposers offer responders between 40 and 50 percent. Only 4 in 100 offer less than 20 percent. Offering such a small amount is quite risky; most responders reject such offers. This is a puzzle: Why would anyone reject an offer as too small? Responders who reject an offer receive nothing, so if one assumes—as theoretical economics traditionally has—that people make economic decisions primarily out of rational self-interest, one would expect that an individual would accept any offer.
Some theorists explain the insistence on fair divisions in the Ultimatum Game by citing our prehistoric ancestors’ need for the support of a strong group. Small groups of hunter-gatherers depended for survival on their members’ strengths. It is counterproductive to outcompete rivals within one’s group to the point where one can no longer depend on them in contests with other groups. But this hypothesis at best explains why proposers offer large amounts, not why responders reject low offers.
A more compelling explanation is that our emotional apparatus has been shaped by millions of years of living in small groups, where it is hard to keep secrets. Our emotions are therefore not finely tuned to one-time, strictly anonymous interactions. In real life we expect our friends and neighbors to notice our decisions. If people know that someone is content with a small share, they are likely to make that person low offers. But if someone is known to angrily reject low offers, others have an incentive to make that person high offers. Consequently, evolution should have favored angry responses to low offers; if one regularly receives fair offers when food is divided, one is more likely to survive. Because one-shot interactions were rare during human evolution, our emotions do not discriminate between one-shot and repeated interactions. Therefore, we respond emotionally to low offers in the Ultimatum Game because we instinctively feel the need to reject dismal offers in order to keep our self-esteem. This self-esteem helps us to acquire a reputation that is beneficial in future encounters.
1. Which one of the following most accurately summarizes the main idea of the passage?
CorrectIncorrect -
Question 2 of 5
2. Question
In an experiment, two strangers are given the opportunity to share $100, subject to the following constraints: One person—the “proposer”—is to suggest how to divide the money and can make only one such proposal. The other person—the “responder”— must either accept or reject the offer without qualification. Both parties know that if the offer is accepted, the money will be split as agreed, but if the offer is rejected, neither will receive anything.
This scenario is called the Ultimatum Game. Researchers have conducted it numerous times with a wide variety of volunteers. Many participants in the role of the proposer seem instinctively to feel that they should offer 50 percent to the responder, because such a division is “fair” and therefore likely to be accepted. Two-thirds of proposers offer responders between 40 and 50 percent. Only 4 in 100 offer less than 20 percent. Offering such a small amount is quite risky; most responders reject such offers. This is a puzzle: Why would anyone reject an offer as too small? Responders who reject an offer receive nothing, so if one assumes—as theoretical economics traditionally has—that people make economic decisions primarily out of rational self-interest, one would expect that an individual would accept any offer.
Some theorists explain the insistence on fair divisions in the Ultimatum Game by citing our prehistoric ancestors’ need for the support of a strong group. Small groups of hunter-gatherers depended for survival on their members’ strengths. It is counterproductive to outcompete rivals within one’s group to the point where one can no longer depend on them in contests with other groups. But this hypothesis at best explains why proposers offer large amounts, not why responders reject low offers.
A more compelling explanation is that our emotional apparatus has been shaped by millions of years of living in small groups, where it is hard to keep secrets. Our emotions are therefore not finely tuned to one-time, strictly anonymous interactions. In real life we expect our friends and neighbors to notice our decisions. If people know that someone is content with a small share, they are likely to make that person low offers. But if someone is known to angrily reject low offers, others have an incentive to make that person high offers. Consequently, evolution should have favored angry responses to low offers; if one regularly receives fair offers when food is divided, one is more likely to survive. Because one-shot interactions were rare during human evolution, our emotions do not discriminate between one-shot and repeated interactions. Therefore, we respond emotionally to low offers in the Ultimatum Game because we instinctively feel the need to reject dismal offers in order to keep our self-esteem. This self-esteem helps us to acquire a reputation that is beneficial in future encounters.
2. The passage implies that the Ultimatum Game is
CorrectIncorrect -
Question 3 of 5
3. Question
In an experiment, two strangers are given the opportunity to share $100, subject to the following constraints: One person—the “proposer”—is to suggest how to divide the money and can make only one such proposal. The other person—the “responder”— must either accept or reject the offer without qualification. Both parties know that if the offer is accepted, the money will be split as agreed, but if the offer is rejected, neither will receive anything.
This scenario is called the Ultimatum Game. Researchers have conducted it numerous times with a wide variety of volunteers. Many participants in the role of the proposer seem instinctively to feel that they should offer 50 percent to the responder, because such a division is “fair” and therefore likely to be accepted. Two-thirds of proposers offer responders between 40 and 50 percent. Only 4 in 100 offer less than 20 percent. Offering such a small amount is quite risky; most responders reject such offers. This is a puzzle: Why would anyone reject an offer as too small? Responders who reject an offer receive nothing, so if one assumes—as theoretical economics traditionally has—that people make economic decisions primarily out of rational self-interest, one would expect that an individual would accept any offer.
Some theorists explain the insistence on fair divisions in the Ultimatum Game by citing our prehistoric ancestors’ need for the support of a strong group. Small groups of hunter-gatherers depended for survival on their members’ strengths. It is counterproductive to outcompete rivals within one’s group to the point where one can no longer depend on them in contests with other groups. But this hypothesis at best explains why proposers offer large amounts, not why responders reject low offers.
A more compelling explanation is that our emotional apparatus has been shaped by millions of years of living in small groups, where it is hard to keep secrets. Our emotions are therefore not finely tuned to one-time, strictly anonymous interactions. In real life we expect our friends and neighbors to notice our decisions. If people know that someone is content with a small share, they are likely to make that person low offers. But if someone is known to angrily reject low offers, others have an incentive to make that person high offers. Consequently, evolution should have favored angry responses to low offers; if one regularly receives fair offers when food is divided, one is more likely to survive. Because one-shot interactions were rare during human evolution, our emotions do not discriminate between one-shot and repeated interactions. Therefore, we respond emotionally to low offers in the Ultimatum Game because we instinctively feel the need to reject dismal offers in order to keep our self-esteem. This self-esteem helps us to acquire a reputation that is beneficial in future encounters.
3. The author’s primary purpose in the passage is to
CorrectIncorrect -
Question 4 of 5
4. Question
In an experiment, two strangers are given the opportunity to share $100, subject to the following constraints: One person—the “proposer”—is to suggest how to divide the money and can make only one such proposal. The other person—the “responder”— must either accept or reject the offer without qualification. Both parties know that if the offer is accepted, the money will be split as agreed, but if the offer is rejected, neither will receive anything.
This scenario is called the Ultimatum Game. Researchers have conducted it numerous times with a wide variety of volunteers. Many participants in the role of the proposer seem instinctively to feel that they should offer 50 percent to the responder, because such a division is “fair” and therefore likely to be accepted. Two-thirds of proposers offer responders between 40 and 50 percent. Only 4 in 100 offer less than 20 percent. Offering such a small amount is quite risky; most responders reject such offers. This is a puzzle: Why would anyone reject an offer as too small? Responders who reject an offer receive nothing, so if one assumes—as theoretical economics traditionally has—that people make economic decisions primarily out of rational self-interest, one would expect that an individual would accept any offer.
Some theorists explain the insistence on fair divisions in the Ultimatum Game by citing our prehistoric ancestors’ need for the support of a strong group. Small groups of hunter-gatherers depended for survival on their members’ strengths. It is counterproductive to outcompete rivals within one’s group to the point where one can no longer depend on them in contests with other groups. But this hypothesis at best explains why proposers offer large amounts, not why responders reject low offers.
A more compelling explanation is that our emotional apparatus has been shaped by millions of years of living in small groups, where it is hard to keep secrets. Our emotions are therefore not finely tuned to one-time, strictly anonymous interactions. In real life we expect our friends and neighbors to notice our decisions. If people know that someone is content with a small share, they are likely to make that person low offers. But if someone is known to angrily reject low offers, others have an incentive to make that person high offers. Consequently, evolution should have favored angry responses to low offers; if one regularly receives fair offers when food is divided, one is more likely to survive. Because one-shot interactions were rare during human evolution, our emotions do not discriminate between one-shot and repeated interactions. Therefore, we respond emotionally to low offers in the Ultimatum Game because we instinctively feel the need to reject dismal offers in order to keep our self-esteem. This self-esteem helps us to acquire a reputation that is beneficial in future encounters.
4. Which one of the following sentences would most logically conclude the final paragraph of the passage?
CorrectIncorrect -
Question 5 of 5
5. Question
In an experiment, two strangers are given the opportunity to share $100, subject to the following constraints: One person—the “proposer”—is to suggest how to divide the money and can make only one such proposal. The other person—the “responder”— must either accept or reject the offer without qualification. Both parties know that if the offer is accepted, the money will be split as agreed, but if the offer is rejected, neither will receive anything.
This scenario is called the Ultimatum Game. Researchers have conducted it numerous times with a wide variety of volunteers. Many participants in the role of the proposer seem instinctively to feel that they should offer 50 percent to the responder, because such a division is “fair” and therefore likely to be accepted. Two-thirds of proposers offer responders between 40 and 50 percent. Only 4 in 100 offer less than 20 percent. Offering such a small amount is quite risky; most responders reject such offers. This is a puzzle: Why would anyone reject an offer as too small? Responders who reject an offer receive nothing, so if one assumes—as theoretical economics traditionally has—that people make economic decisions primarily out of rational self-interest, one would expect that an individual would accept any offer.
Some theorists explain the insistence on fair divisions in the Ultimatum Game by citing our prehistoric ancestors’ need for the support of a strong group. Small groups of hunter-gatherers depended for survival on their members’ strengths. It is counterproductive to outcompete rivals within one’s group to the point where one can no longer depend on them in contests with other groups. But this hypothesis at best explains why proposers offer large amounts, not why responders reject low offers.
A more compelling explanation is that our emotional apparatus has been shaped by millions of years of living in small groups, where it is hard to keep secrets. Our emotions are therefore not finely tuned to one-time, strictly anonymous interactions. In real life we expect our friends and neighbors to notice our decisions. If people know that someone is content with a small share, they are likely to make that person low offers. But if someone is known to angrily reject low offers, others have an incentive to make that person high offers. Consequently, evolution should have favored angry responses to low offers; if one regularly receives fair offers when food is divided, one is more likely to survive. Because one-shot interactions were rare during human evolution, our emotions do not discriminate between one-shot and repeated interactions. Therefore, we respond emotionally to low offers in the Ultimatum Game because we instinctively feel the need to reject dismal offers in order to keep our self-esteem. This self-esteem helps us to acquire a reputation that is beneficial in future encounters.
5. In the context of the passage, the author would be most likely to consider the explanation in the third paragraph more favorably if it were shown that
CorrectIncorrect